Trump
Excerpt from Vodka, Hookers, and the Russian Mafia : My Life in Moscow
pp. 383-395
Tashkent, Uzbekistan, has been appearing and reappearing on my radar for years. The late—murdered—Yuri Shchekochikhin had outlined for me the Uzbek cotton mafia scam. He had given me documents back in 1990 that mentioned there were more than twenty-five major organized crime groups in Tashkent by 1985. The Taiwanese, the Jap’s representative in Europe who helped create one of the world’s biggest drug trafficking networks, is from Tashkent. Shamil Tarpishchev, President Yeltsin’s tennis coach and one-time business partner of Otari Kvantrishvili in the National Sports Foundation, hails from Tashkent. Michael and Lev Chernoy, a couple of the biggest metals magnates in Russia—suspected by law enforcement to be responsible for multiple murders and massive money laundering—come from the Uzbek capital. The head of MAPO Bank, Alisher Usmanov—who has gone on to become a billionaire—grew up in Tashkent. Gafur Rakhimov, who helped the Chernoys get started in their underground production, was a key advisor to the Solntsevo organized crime group—and friend, mentor, and protector of Usmanov—is from Tashkent. Rakhimov is recognized as one of the biggest drug traffickers in the world. A top executive at Boris Birshtein’s Seabeco is also from Uzbekistan. He’s gone on to become one of the biggest metals traders and essentially take control of 20 percent of the economy of Kazakhstan. Many of them knew each other growing up. More recently, another man connected to Tashkent appeared on my radar. He wasn’t born in Uzbekistan, but he’s an important figure in Uzbek crime circles. He’s tied to almost every one of those listed above. He had worked at the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry—one of those places that sounds innocuous on the surface, but was run by the KGB. His name is Tevfik Arif. And he was Donald Trump’s business partner.
His name is Tevfik Arif. And he was Donald Trump’s business partner.
In the 1990s, Arif worked in Kazakhstan for the metals trader that had partnered with the Chernoy brothers and taken over most of the Russian aluminum industry. In 2001, Arif had formed a company called Bayrock Group, which was believed to be financed by two prominent businessmen in the metals industry who had previously worked for Birshtein at Seabeco and collaborated closely with the Chernoy brothers. Bayrock’s financiers had carved out a dominant position in the Kazakh metals industry and had worked with Arif. The financiers also appeared in Bayrock’s promotional material. (In the early 2000s, the financiers were accused of money laundering in Belgium. Interpol alleged that the Chernoy brothers were suspected of money laundering, embezzlement of funds, and contract killings.) In 2002, Bayrock moved into Trump Tower, two floors below Trump’s office. In 2006, plans were unveiled on Trump’s show, The Apprentice, to build Trump SoHo. His partners in that project were Bayrock Group and a company called the Sapir Organization, which had been founded by Georgian businessman, Tamir Sapir. The project was managed by Bayrock employee Felix Sater—an ex-con turned U.S. spook turned real estate developer, supposedly—and completed in 2008. A pamphlet published by Bayrock featured projects from SoHo to Fort Lauderdale to Phoenix. In the section called Strategic Partners, a smiling Arif stands next to the future president of the United States. Most of the projects eventually failed; the U.S. government suspected that the partners were involved in a massive money laundering operation.
Most of the projects eventually failed; the U.S. government suspected that the partners were involved in a massive money laundering operation.
In 2010, something interesting happened. Across the Atlantic. In Turkey. Turkish police raided a luxury yacht that had once belonged to Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey. The boat had come to police attention because of conversations overheard on a wiretap about trafficking in young women. Girls had been brought in from Russia and Ukraine to work as prostitutes, some working on the yacht servicing wealthy clients.
During the raid, police found girls who were as young as sixteen.
The prostitution ring that organized the yacht was trafficking girls as young as thirteen for wealthy businessmen in luxury hotels in Turkey. Bayrock’s financiers were on board the yacht that day, and Tevfik Arif was arrested, believed to be financing and running the prostitution ring. He was charged with trade in human beings, prostitution, trafficking in juveniles under eighteen—and creation of criminal organizations with the purpose of the commission of crime.
Arif’s partner, Felix Sater, has just as colorful a background.
In 1991, he had gotten into an argument with a commodities broker at a restaurant in Manhattan. Sater stabbed the broker’s cheek and neck with the broken stem of a martini glass, breaking his jaw and severing nerves. He was convicted of first-degree assault and spent a little over a year in prison before being paroled. In 1998, he pleaded guilty to his involvement in a $40 million stock fraud scheme. Some say it was on behalf of several Italian-American mafia families in New York; others thought there was Russian mafia involvement. Could be both. To save his skin, he agreed to consult with the FBI on organized crime and with the CIA on terrorism, reportedly doing good work tracking weapons and groups. Sater had many meetings with Trump, popping in at his office regularly, talking about potential projects, especially about getting a Trump Tower built in Moscow. That project never materialized, but the relationship between the two seemed reasonably close. Sater had grown up with Michael Cohen, Trump’s personal lawyer. Cohen helped create, and then was tasked with cleaning up, the Stormy Daniels porn scandal. Cohen was pretty mobbed up himself through family and friends. In 2015, Sater had emailed Cohen, “Our boy can become president of the USA, we can engineer it,” referring to Trump. “I will get all of Putin’s team to buy in on this, I will manage this process.”
“Our boy can become president of the USA, we can engineer it,” referring to Trump. “I will get all of Putin’s team to buy in on this, I will manage this process.”
I learned another interesting thing about Sater from an American journalist working in Central Europe. On the phone one day, she asked, “Do you know the lawyer, Robert S. Wolf?”
“No.”
“He’s Sater’s attorney.”
“And?”
“Check out the Jap’s Wikipedia page. That’s where you’ll find his name. Robert S. Wolf was his lawyer, too. He was on the Jap’s legal team.”
Sure enough, there he was. That’s quite a coincidence. Of course, in and of itself it didn’t mean anything. It could, in fact, be a coincidence—criminal defense attorneys of a certain sort specialize in high-profile, gangster-type cases. But Russia had beaten me over the head so much about coincidences—and the fact that many relationships in this game at this level are not coincidences—that I have to remain open to the possibility that they’re both part of the same network. Bayrock’s former finance director—an American—had told Bloomberg media that “Felix knew how to be charming, and he knew how to be brutally nasty. He has a talent for drawing people in. He has charm and charisma. But that’s what con men do.” The finance director had characterized Bayrock as a criminal enterprise, alleging that Bayrock was “covertly mob-owned and operated,” “backed by oligarchs and money they stole from the Russian people,” and “engaged in the businesses of financial-institution fraud, tax fraud, human trafficking, child prostitution, statutory rape, and, on occasion, real estate.” The real purpose of the company, he said, was “to launder many millions of dollars and evade taxes.”
Sounds about right.
Some additional light had been shed on Felix Sater’s family ties. Apparently, his father was deeply involved in the Russian black market in Moscow in the sixties and seventies, before moving his family to Baltimore. Toward the end of the seventies, Felix’s father found himself in Brighton Beach, working as a soldier in the Genovese crime family. Extortion was his game. When Felix was in court years later, his father was referred to as “a Mogilevich crime syndicate boss.” That is, Semyon Mogilevich—the boss of all bosses—who would, over decades, compile an impressive criminal resume: member of the Lyuber crime group; one of the de facto leaders of the Solntsevo group; running global prostitution, weapons, and drug rings; YBM Magnex fraud; Bank of New York money laundering; and a list of others. Speculation circulated that Felix himself supposedly had a long relationship with Mogilevich, dating back to the nineties, and served as an important contact for Mogilevich in the U.S.
Maybe, maybe not. But… The FBI and CIA had plenty of consultants on organized crime and terrorism, but someone who had contact with Mogilevich, top man of interest on the FBI’s Most Wanted list for years? Sater would have been invaluable.
The new case arrived by phone call from Kroll headquarters in New York. It was the late nineties, and I was close to wrapping up my time in Russia. A building was being sold in Manhattan, and we had been hired to look into one of the principals in the deal, a man named Tamir Sapir. Sapir was the founder of the Sapir Organization. I’d never heard of him. I said his name out loud in the office, announcing to Andrei and Zhenya our new subject. Zhenya exclaimed, “Tamir!”
“You know him?”
“Of course. He’s famous. His store was one of the stops when our guys were in New York City.”
Sapir had started an electronics store in mid-Manhattan in the late seventies. Many of his customers were Soviet diplomats and high-ranking officials, many of whom were connected to the United Nations, read: KGB.
“Primakov used to go there when he was in New York,” Zhenya said.
“How do you know that?”
“Because I lived in the same building as him, on the next floor. He was my neighbor,” he replied.
“Primakov” was Yevgeny Primakov, who had held top positions in the KGB. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, he was head of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), which had spun off from the KGB. (The KGB’s domestic security service had come to be known as the FSB in 1995.) The name was new, but it was essentially the same organization. Primakov hadn’t made significant personnel changes and left the structure largely intact for nearly six years, when he became the Russian foreign minister. The officials who had visited Sapir’s store had orchestrated a profitable black market of Western goods behind the Iron Curtain. Of course, demand was high. Tens of millions of people wanted to get their hands on electronics. The coach from the Soviet wrestling team in Albany had returned to Moscow with his coveted video player.
And, as I learned, a massive trade in smuggled electronics, among other things, had operated through East Germany with the assistance of the military and the gang of smugglers. The smugglers were familiar names: Dmitry Yakubovich, Semyon Mogilevich, Solntsevo, the Taiwanese, Boris Birshtein, Seabeco, and all the others. In 1989, Sapir had accepted an invitation from those officials to become a willing and reliable accomplice in that black market trade. He sent thousands of VCRs, microwaves, TVs, portable tape players, and other electronic goods to the Soviet Union. In exchange, bureaucrats like the Soviet minister of petrochemicals granted Sapir rights to distribute 50,000 tons of fertilizer and 41 million barrels of oil. Sapir pocketed one dollar per barrel reselling Soviet oil to the largest oil companies in the West. “It was a stroke of luck,” he said. “I was a schmuck in the right place at the right time.” It feels like a little more than luck.
Had Sapir been one of the originating points of the smuggling chain that ran through East Germany? Was money from the Soviet military budget being diverted to his pockets in exchange for electronics? How would that store have survived otherwise if Soviet officials had not been the vast majority of his clients? Was all of this happenstance, or was his presence in the U.S. part of a premeditated plan by the KGB? He certainly had proximity to the smugglers.
His partner in the electronics store was Sam Kislin.
Kislin had set up Trans Commodities, partnering with the Chernoy brothers. Later, the FBI determined that Kislin was a member of the Jap’s organization. Sapir had become wealthy and had moved into real estate. We were tasked with checking him out in relation to the sale of that building in Manhattan. In addition to the subcontractors we had farmed out the assignment to, I had decided to visit Gennady to ask his opinion, which also would give us an excuse to get together.
“Okay, meet me at my office at 3:00 p.m.,” he said.
His office was now at Bank of Moscow, where he was the head of economic security. He’d been there a couple of years already, since leaving the MVD. I remembered him contemplating retirement and telling me about the bank opportunity, wondering aloud if he should take it.
The bank was less than a ten-minute walk from the American Embassy and directly across the street from the Parliament building.
In its previous life, the bank building had been the Moscow mayor’s office.
I had sat in the lobby waiting for the elevator to deliver Gennady to the ground floor.
He arrived and approached me; I stood; he offered his hand. We shook, and he immediately realized something.
“I’ve never told you about this place.”
“What about it?” I asked.
“You remember in 1993, when the tanks fired into the Parliament building?”
“Of course.” That’s not the kind of thing you forget.
He turned and walked across the lobby to the opposite wall. I followed him. He placed his hand flat and started gliding it along the surface. He found what he was looking for.
“Here, feel that,” he said.
I put my finger in the divot he had pointed to and then turned back to him. He glided his hand again and found more divots. “Bullet holes,” he said. “After the pro-rebel demonstrators took over this building, I was the commander leading the counterattack.”
He turned toward the front door.
“We started here at the main entrance and were immediately met with gunfire.” He pointed to the staircase in the lobby. “They were shooting from the top of the stairs, there. The electricity had been turned off, so we had very little light. We pushed them back and swept through the place floor by floor.”
Another moment of Gennady cementing his credentials—like Sasha—as a man’s man, a cop’s cop, and a badass.
I had come to see him about Tamir Sapir. Gennady’s answer was simple and straightforward. “He’s a con man, but you can’t consider him a gangster.” A few years later, the con man and his company became partners with Bayrock Group and the Trump Organization.
A few years later, the con man and his company became partners with Bayrock Group and the Trump Organization.
But that wasn’t the first interaction between Sapir and Trump. In the late seventies, Trump was in the midst of a hotel renovation project and needed several hundred television sets. He turned to a company called Joy Lud, the electronics store owned by Sam Kislin and Tamir Sapir. Trump had known Kislin and Sapir for years. Later, Sam Kislin would introduce himself at the U.S. Embassy in Kiev, Ukraine, as “President Donald Trump’s adviser.” In the early morning hours of April 16, 2013, a team of FBI agents raided an apartment in Trump Tower in New York City. At the same time, a similar operation was taking place in Los Angeles. Big stakes—and illegal—international gambling was being operated out of both locations. Card games were attended by Hollywood celebrities and business titans. Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs—the majority of the clientele—were placing bets on a variety of sporting events. But they were also laundering a good amount of money.
But they were also laundering a good amount of money.
A U.S. federal prosecutor called the ring “one of the biggest bookmaking operations in the world,” laundering a total of around $100 million in gambling proceeds. Around $50 million of that amount had been transferred into the U.S. through a series of shell corporations in Cyprus that would issue phony loan agreements. The gambling operation was headquartered in Trump Tower, and it had been running for more than six years. Trump’s claim that Obama had bugged Trump Tower? It wasn’t Obama listening to Trump; it was the FBI listening to Russian gangsters. The two gambling dens in New York and LA are related. They’re owned and overseen by one man. It’s the same man who had rigged the pairs figure skating competition during the Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games in 2002. He had arranged for a French judge to throw her vote to the Russian skating pair, instead of awarding gold to the Canadians, the rightful winners.
It’s the same man who helped create the world’s largest money laundering operation. It’s the same man who had introduced Shamil Tarpishchev to Ricardo Fanchini to create a global drug trafficking network. That man—the owner of the whole gambling enterprise—monitored the poker games from afar, safely ensconced in Moscow. That man was the Taiwanese.
His business partner had purchased the apartment in Trump Tower, moving money earned from racketeering through shell accounts in Cyprus. The apartment in Trump Tower had been previously owned by Yeltsin’s personal banker who sold it to the Taiwanese’s business partner in 2009. A key figure in the gambling ring owned a condo in Trump International Beach Resort in Sunny Isles, Florida, and owned a shell company—the director of which had been married to Semyon Mogilevich. Just a few months after the raids on his gambling operations, the Taiwanese was seen at Trump’s Miss Universe pageant in Moscow as a VIP guest. Trump was there as well. Not only had Alexander Shnaider been an executive at Seabeco; he was the son-in-law of Boris Birshtein. He was also a business partner of Donald Trump. Shnaider developed the Trump Tower and Hotel in Toronto, which was to be the tallest building in Canada. (It was renamed after President Trump had made controversial policy statements.)
Reportedly, financing for the project came from Raiffeisen Bank (RZB), which has long been closely associated with Semyon Mogilevich of YBM Magnex fame and the massive Bank of New York money laundering scandal. RZB has been called “the go-to bank for top-level Russian dirty stuff,” an allegation based on a series of Russian corruption scandals.
Part of the financing for the Toronto tower apparently had come from the sale of stock in a Ukrainian steelmaker that Shnaider owned. An $850 million stake was purchased by a Russian state bank, the same state bank that had been moving billions overseas through Birshtein and Olshansky some fifteen years earlier.
Interestingly, the chairman of the state bank’s supervisory board was the former director of the KGB and Russian president, Vladimir Putin. (Two of Birshtein’s other former employees at Seabeco—the metals traders who had been on Tevfik Arif’s prostitution yacht—were by then already financing another Trump-branded tower.) The Wall Street Journal had reported that the state bank provided financing for the construction of the hotel in 2010. Shnaider had sold at least half of his company’s ownership in the steel mill to buyers financed by the state bank. Then the state bank acquired the buyers. Did this mean that Vladimir Putin was now Donald Trump’s business partner?
Did this mean that Vladimir Putin was now Donald Trump’s business partner?
The Jap was also no stranger to Trump properties.
Shortly after he arrived in the States, the mafia boss had made nineteen trips to Trump’s Taj Mahal in Atlantic City in less than two months. The Taj Mahal had become the Russian mob’s go-to gambling joint on the East Coast. As was typical with casinos, Russian high rollers at the Taj Mahal received up to $100,000 of complimentary goods and services per visit, like free food, rooms, champagne, cigarettes, entertainment, and transportation in stretch limos and helicopters. As long as the gangsters were dropping big money, the perks would continue. And they were dropping big money. Some lost hundreds of thousands of dollars a night. Money laundering was an issue for the Taj Mahal. It was fined $10 million in 2015 for “willful violations.” It was the largest penalty levied against a casino since reporting requirements began in 2003. The U.S. Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) said, “The Trump Organization admitted that it failed to implement and maintain an effective anti-money laundering program; failed to report suspicious transactions; failed to properly file required currency transaction reports; and failed to keep appropriate records as required by the Bank Secrecy Act.” The Jap also lived in a Trump apartment and had the phone and fax numbers of the Trump front office in his address book.
The Jap’s business partner, Felix Komarov, was also a resident of a Trump property, owning an apartment at the Trump Plaza in New York. Komarov’s name came up in the Newtel-MGK investigation, and he co-owned the Moscow Rolls Royce dealership with the Jap, using it as yet another of the countless avenues for money laundering, according to the FBI. David Bogatin—brother of YBM Magnex International president, Jacob Bogatin—needed a place to launder his money.
Hundreds of millions of dollars, at least.
The Russians had started eyeing real estate as a way to launder money, and David Bogatin was on the cutting edge of that movement. David met Trump, who talked him into buying five apartments. In 1984, David spent $5.8 million on those apartments.
suspect it was always David’s plan to buy multiple apartments. Not so sure Trump talked him into anything.
Why does one man purchase five apartments in the same building?
One reason was to clean money. He was making so much money from a gas tax skimming scam in the New York Metropolitan Area, he didn’t know what to do with it all. Another reason, according to U.S. prosecutors, was to set up a prostitution ring, which David had done. David also provided a conduit for his brother, Jacob, to launder his ill-gotten gains through Trump Tower condos. Jacob had a string of mob-related convictions, including financial fraud and tax evasion. Starting in 2006, Donald Trump, Jr., went to Russia about six times over a year and a half. He made the following observation at a real estate conference in New York City: “In terms of high-end product influx into the U.S., Russians make up a pretty disproportionate cross-section of a lot of our assets. We see a lot of money pouring in from Russia.” Eric Trump had been asked how it was that two Trump golf properties in the UK were reportedly losing nearly two million pounds a year, yet documents showed that, in reality, hundreds of millions of dollars were flowing into them. “Well, we don’t rely on American banks,” Eric said. “We have all the funding we need out of Russia…. We’ve got some guys that really, really love golf, and they’re really invested in our programs.”
In addition to guys who “really, really love golf,” the Trump Organization as a whole had been a magnet for Russian money. Sixty-three individuals with Russian passports or addresses have bought at least $100 million worth of property in seven Trump luxury towers in southern Florida. Sixty-five condos in Trump World by the United Nations have been sold to Russian investors. Many of them had personal meetings with Trump in Trump’s office or at business events.
Trump and his companies have been linked to at least ten wealthy former Soviet businessmen with alleged ties to criminal organizations or money laundering. I can’t help but wonder: If Trump doesn’t work through American banks; and he has as much money as he needs through the Russians; and massive amounts of Russian money are moving through Trump properties; and Semyon Mogilevich is Mr. Big of the underworld, moving billions, and he’s friends with Vladimir Putin…to what extent are Semyon Mogilevich and Vladimir Putin an influence on Donald Trump?
This is all interesting and perhaps even a bit scary. But, I’ve come to believe that the truly scary part is not the presence of mobsters or even the amount of money involved.
The scariest part is that there is no such thing as independent money in Russia.
Business, politics, and organized crime are all thoroughly interconnected. The way we typically think about mafia is not the way it plays in Russia. The Russian mafia is not independent of the state; it is a tool for the state to use.
And, as I saw over and over, virtually no one is beyond the reach of the KGB. To some extent, the state dictates how and when you’ll be able to enjoy your millions and billions. It is no accident that oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky spent years in prison. His major crime was ignoring Putin’s dictate that oligarchs are not to get involved in politics, especially as a dissenting voice.
And this general wisdom applies across the board. Anyone making waves would be dealt with most harshly, whether wealthy or just stirring up trouble. The gods at the top of the system will squash you like a bug.
Just ask Boris Nemtsov, former deputy prime minister and oppositionist to Putin who was gunned down and died on the bridge just outside the Kremlin walls behind Red Square in 2015. He was preparing to release a report regarding the Russian seizure of Crimea in 2014. Just ask Anna Politkovskaya, the Russian journalist, writer, and human rights activist who reported critically on the Russian war in Chechnya. In 2006, she was shot twice in the chest, once in the shoulder, and once in the head at point-blank range. She was found dead in the elevator of her apartment building. Just ask investigative journalist, Yuri Shchekochikhin; and former Russian spy, Alexander Litvinenko; and American journalist, Paul Klebnikov.
All of these people now testify from the grave.
Just ask opposition candidate, Alexei Navalny, who somehow survived being poisoned in August 2020. He had posted YouTube videos detailing the massive payments—tribute—that oligarchs, like Alisher Usmanov, make to the highest political levels inside Putin’s Russia.